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Abstract: In his detailed response to our paper on sample size in qualitative research, 
Norman Blaikie raises important issues concerning conceptual definitions and taxonomy. In 
particular, he points out the problems associated with a loose, generic application of 
adjectives such as ‘qualitative’ or ‘inductive.’ We endorse this concern, though we suggest 
that in some specific contexts a broad categorization may be more appropriate than a more 
nuanced distinction – provided that it is clear in which sense the terms are employed. 
However, other concepts, such as saturation, do not lend themselves to generic use, and 
require a more detailed conceptualization. Blaikie’s analysis also makes it clear that 
meaningful discussion of sample size in qualitative research cannot occur with reference to 
an undifferentiated conception of the nature of qualitative research; clear distinctions need to 
be made within this approach in terms of methodology, ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, and broader research paradigms. 
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In his response (Blaikie, 2018) to our paper (Sim et al, 2018), Norman Blaikie raises a 
number of important issues that are relevant not only to the issue of sample size but also to 
how we think about social research more broadly. Much of his discussion centres on issues of 
definition or taxonomy, and our rejoinder will take these as its primary focus. 
We agree that, as a term that strictly applies at the level of data, the use of ‘qualitative’ as a 
form of synecdoche to denote a broader research approach, or as a form of metonymy to 
describe researchers who carry out such research, is in some respects problematic. It obscures 
the interplay between design, data collection, data analysis and theorizing, and thereby tends 
to homogenize research approaches that, whilst lying within a particular broad tradition, are 
different in important ways in terms of both their methodology and their underlying 
philosophical assumptions. Furthermore, classifying research as either qualitative or 
quantitative tends to reinforce the view that these are irreconcilable polar opposites. In our 
view, a classification of research on the basis of the research question, as being either 
‘exploratory’, ‘descriptive’ or ‘explanatory’ (Sim and Wright, 2000; Robson, 2002), provides 
a clearer and more discriminating understanding of different approaches to research.  
However, terminology needs to be matched to the context in which it is used. Provided that it 
does not give rise to serious misconceptions, a somewhat crude classification (such as 
qualitative versus quantitative) may sometimes be more helpful in the circumstances and for 
the audience concerned than a subtler one (such as exploratory versus descriptive versus 
explanatory), particularly where the aim is to encourage a broad audience of researchers to 
engage with these issues and to think more carefully about the implications for their own 
research. In a similar way, our characterization of grounded theory as broadly inductive (Sim 
et al, 2018) is, we believe, probably sufficient in terms of framing the discussion on sample 
size, even though a full account of the process of analysis in grounded theory would need to 
consider an abductive as well as an inductive logic, particularly if wishing to describe 
different phases of the analysis or to contrast the different approaches within grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2009; Reichertz, 2007). We would not wish, however, to suggest that an inductive 
logic ‘incorporates’ an abductive logic – rather, that each of these shares a broad conception 
of the relationship between data and theory, implicit in Blaikie’s definition of these terms. 
The issue of themes is another case in point. In defining a theme, Braun and Clarke (2006 p. 
82) state that it ‘captures something important about the data in relation to the research 
question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set’ 
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(original emphasis). As these authors indicate, thematic analysis, defined in this broad 
manner, may be associated with a variety of modes of analysis, and ‘theme’ may therefore be 
used as quite a generic term. However, Braun and Clarke (2006) proceed to describe a 
particular approach to thematic analysis that has distinct characteristics, and differs in certain 
important respects from the forms of thematic analysis described by Boyatzis (1998) and 
Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012). The specificity with which thematic analysis needs to 
be defined is, again, related to the context of its use.1 
In contrast to the above examples, however, is the concept of saturation. Blaikie (2018) gives 
a clear description of what he understands by saturation in the context of sampling for 
typological analysis. Such specificity is crucial, as the different ways in which saturation is 
conceptualized have important implications for its use (Saunders et al, 2017); accordingly, 
the generic use of this term has little to recommend it.2  
Another key message to be drawn from Blaikie’s (2018) discussion is that questions of 
sample size – and those relating to other aspects of methodology – cannot be settled by 
reference to an undifferentiated conception of what constitutes ‘qualitative’ research.3 Within 
this tradition of research, there are important distinctions in terms of methodology, 
ontological and epistemological assumptions, and broader research paradigms.4 As we have 
tried to indicate in our paper (Sim et al., 2018), choices regarding sample size must take 
account of, for example, whether a phenomenological or an ethnographic methodology is 
employed, or whether analysis is based on the principles of interpretive phenomenological 
analysis (Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009) or qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2014).  
Not only is ‘qualitative’ research often viewed in undifferentiated terms, but it is also prone 
to certain unwarranted conjunctions – for example, that it is necessarily idiographic and 
averse to any form of generalization, or that it must be concerned with an interpretive 
understanding, or that if it is indeed taking an interpretive stance, focusing on subjective 
meanings, the phenomenon that it studies cannot be a natural kind but must in some sense be 
socially constructed, or that hypotheses are necessarily incompatible with this type of 
research. To take the last two of these claims, a study that seeks, for example, to gain an 
interpretive understanding of the subjective experience of living with diabetes is not thereby 
committed to regarding this condition as a social construct rather than a ‘real’ disease. 
Equally, as Blaikie (2018) suggests, hypotheses may feature in ‘qualitative’ research. When 
they do, however, it is likely to be in a very different way from their role in studies where 
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statistical hypothesis-testing is the driving force behind design and analysis (Mead, 1988). 
Thus, the process of constant comparison during coding and category formation within 
grounded theory can be viewed in terms of testing certain emergent hypotheses (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), but in a radically different way from the testing of a priori hypotheses in 
research based on the hypotheticodeductive model.  
In closing, we reiterate our agreement with Blaikie regarding the problems of considering 
‘qualitative’ research in a manner that is in one sense very broad, but that also assumes 
narrow associations with specific logics of inquiry. However, whilst clearly important in the 
sample size debate, this issue opens up a much wider discussion. We naturally welcome this 
discussion, but would re-emphasize the context in which terminology is used, and the need to 
consider whether or not a particular term lends itself to being employed generically. This is 
not to suggest that misconceptions in the use of terms such as ‘qualitative’ should go 
unchallenged; but perhaps we should pick our battles one at a time. For the specific purposes 
of articulating the primary argument in our paper – that defining sample size a priori in 
research that ‘adopts a logic of inquiry in which knowledge evolves as an outcome of an 
iterative process’ (Blaikie, 2018) is in essence illogical – we would suggest that the term 
‘qualitative’, and a somewhat simplified distinction between ‘inductive’ and ‘deductive’, are 
perhaps appropriate here. At the same time, we believe that discussing sample size in relation 
to a loosely defined conception of saturation is unhelpful and misguided. As these debates 
progress, and, optimistically, some of the more problematic assumptions we identified 
concerning sample size become less prevalent, perhaps then we can begin to challenge 
thinking around this terminology more fully. So, picking up on Blaikie’s (2018) closing 
sentence, whilst we agree that caution must be taken in the use of ‘qualitative’ in sample size 
discussions, perhaps we need not go so far as to leave it out entirely.  
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1 DeSantis and Ugarriza (2000 p. 369) express concern at the ‘varied and imprecise use of the term theme as it is 
applied from one qualitative research method to another.’ The imprecision they refer to is indeed problematic, 
but whilst we might expect consistency in the use of ‘theme’ within a particular method, variation in use across 
different methods may simply reflect underlying differences in such methods. 
2 Perhaps more pernicious is where crude terminology or classifications are used in a misleading way. 
Describing ‘quantitative’ research as positivist, often as a mark of opprobrium, overlooks the fact that such 
research need not embody all of the classic assumptions of positivism – in particular, its hostility to theoretical 
entities (Hacking, 1983). 
3 We follow Blaikie’s (2018) use of inverted commas to signal reservations as to the use of this term. We would 
also note, however, that this might well be an occasion where the broad use of the terms ‘qualitative’ (or 
‘quantitative’) is not out of place. 
4 Blaikie and Priest (2017) provide detailed discussion of neo-positive, interpretive and critical realist 
paradigms, arguing that whilst such paradigms are unavoidable in social research, exclusive loyalty to just one 
paradigm is unnecessary. 
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